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Abstract
To what extent does the value of a development determine the value of planning gain? The correlation between the two is not as straightforward as one might expect. Variations in the behavioural and heuristic norms that define context-specific practices have refreshed long-standing interests in ‘planning cultures’ (Knieling and Othengraffen, 2009; Sanyal, 2005). We explore the degree to which variations in planning culture might shed explanatory light on variations in local planning authorities’ capacity to exact developer contributions. Using a case study of English local planning authorities, we provide evidence of the limited explanatory power of traditional variables in explaining the value of developer contributions and present qualitative evidence of the effects of local planning authority culture and practices.

Introduction 
The idea that developers should make some form of compensation for the ‘unearned’ uplift in land values attributable to the award of planning consent is common to many planning systems around the world (Monk and Crook, 2016).  However, determining how this uplift in land values should be priced and, correspondingly, what method is best to exact this value varies significantly. In some societies, such as the People’s Republic of China, auctions represent the preferred method of establishing a value for land upon which the right to develop has been granted (Cai et al., 2013). Elsewhere levies or land taxes are employed (Franzsen and Riël, 2009), such as non-negotiable developer obligations in Spain (Gozalvo Zamorano and Munoz Gielen, 2017), whilst in other settings developer contributions are determined by negotiation on a case-by-case basis, such as in Turkey (Turk, 2018) and Ireland (Fox-Rogers and Murphy, 2015). Occasionally a hybrid or parallel system prevails, such as in England where local planning authorities have the option to employ either or both a Community Infrastructure Levy (usually expressed as £X per M2 of development) and a negotiated approach through the Section 106 process (Crook, 2016). 
Variation within counties also occurs enabled by the devolution of power to local government to assess planning applications and capture public value through development. Whether intra-national variations emerge from housing and development market conditions and the complexity of the planning environment or are explained by distinct local planning cultures is infrequently explored (Dunning, Watkins and Ferrari, 2016), yet is a vital issue for anyone  endorsing or recommending adjustments to systems of value capture. Responding to this evidence gap and the uncertainty in explaining development outcomes from simple economic indicators, there is now increasing recognition that variations in the behavioural and heuristic norms that define context-specific planning practice are fundamental to explaining variations in planning and development outcomes, not least in shaping market behaviours and outcomes (Adams and Watkins, 2014). For many researchers considering the behavioural aspects of planning has refreshed long-standing interests in ‘planning cultures’ (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2009; Sanyal, 2005). The relationship between planning cultures and planning gain, is however, under-researched. 
In this article, we seek to consider variations within a single country and explore the roles of culture and behaviour in determining the value of developer contributions. England is an interesting case study to examine the relationship between planning culture and planning gain value because of the widely varying economic conditions in different urban and rural contexts across the country and because the discretionary nature encourages localised and relational development decisions (Campbell et al., 2000) within a flexible development-led system (Gielen and Tasan-Kok, 2010). In taking England as our focus we will use the language that has grown up in this context to describe developer contribution practices: ‘planning agreements’ describe the contractual arrangement between developer and local planning authority that set out ‘planning obligations’, which are the specific set of contributions the developer must make in order for their proposal to be acceptable to the local planning authority.  
Whilst England has a planning system with a singular national framework for planning laws and policy guidance, top-down policy from central government does not automatically translate into practice within local planning systems (Campbell and Henneberry, 2005). The discretionary nature of the planning system in England means that local planning authorities have significant capacity to 'interpret', resist, or embrace central government policy (Clayton, 1998; Booth, 2007). We see planning cultures as a useful descriptor of variations in local planning practice and development and obligation outcomes. Planning culture is not solely contingent upon a form of historical institutionalism, but leaves space for local agency and personality in defining a particular moment where planning outcomes are negotiated and obligations agreed between parties, and in England’s case the value of planning obligations is determined within planning cultures operating in a diverse array of market contexts. For our purposes where there are shared meanings between different actors in the development process and that these values are present in interactions between those actors there exists some form of shared planning culture (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2015).
As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, in England, contested calculative practices influence how much value is extracted from the development process as planning obligations, whether through the Community Infrastructure Levy or S106 or S278 planning agreements (Dunning and Keskin, 2019). Whilst geographic variation in planning gain outcomes is not new (e.g. Healey et al., 1995), few studies have explored the extent to which this variation is explained by more than market conditions. Here, we build upon one attempt, the argument made in Dunning, Watkins and Ferrari (2016) that there is widespread intraregional variation in the value of planning obligations, arising in part from differences in planning culture. We use a new quantitative dataset on the number and value of developer contributions (which includes the first full valuation of Community Infrastructure Levy) and original qualitative insights from roundtable discussions with developers and interviews with local authority planning officers to provide evidence of variations in planning obligation values from the perspective of planning cultures.  
Determining Developer Contributions: Market Forces or State Actors?
Developer contributions have long been an element of planning policy in England (Cullingworth, 1980).  The scope and remit of these exactions from the development process have been determined at various moments by important pieces of legislation including the Town and Country Planning Act’s Development Charge (1947), the Land Commission Act (1967), the Community Land Act (1975) and the Development Land Tax Act (1976).  
Codifying developer contributions through contractual ‘planning agreements’ between applicants for planning consent and the awarding local planning authority was first permitted under the Town and Country Planning Act (1971). Since this time planning obligations have been exacted to make what would otherwise be an unacceptable development permissible in planning terms (Jowell, 1977). By the early 2000s planning obligations were being used to compensate third parties for externalities and as an informal betterment tax (Corkindale, 2004), which led to calls to separate the two economic functions into direct mitigation and affordable housing contributions, and a planning gain supplement charged to provide wider infrastructure (Crook et al., 2006).  The Community Infrastructure Levy was introduced in 2008 in response (Crook, 2016). As Catney and Henneberry (2019) argue, the evolution of developer contributions in England is a muddy picture of the wider transition in political economy and nature of neoliberalism operating in England. 
Consequently, the developer contributions environment that prevailed in 2016/17 was set by two pieces of legislation operating within this broadly neoliberal paradigm. Firstly, the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act provides local planning authorities with the right to negotiate obligatory contributions - hence ‘planning obligations’ - with developers on a case-by-case basis. The contributions agreed represent the necessary conditions to make the proposed development acceptable in planning terms (MHCLG, 2018). Section 106 of the Act makes this provision, which gives rise to the shorthand ‘S106 agreement’ in common parlance for this form of planning obligation. S106, as a shorthand for planning agreements, also routinely includes the works under section 278 of the 1980 Highway Act, which makes provision for agreements between local planning authorities and third parties for works to roads. Secondly, the Community Infrastructure levy (CIL) regulations, introduced under the Planning Act 2008 and brought into effect through the CIL regulations of 2010, represents a locally determined fixed charge on development (Donatantonio, 2008). 
For proponents, the negotiated approach to agreeing planning obligations allows for context specific flexibility in line with the discretionary nature of the planning system in England (Claydon and Smith, 1997). Those locations that are in a strong position to bargain are able to do so; settings where development viability is less clear cut are able to relax the requirement for compensation accruing to the award of planning consent (ODPM, 2005). However, the implicit acceptance that there is a strong asymmetry in bargaining power that is to some extent explained by geographic location has led others to describe the system as ‘capricious’ (McAllister, 2017) and is a theme throughout this special issue. 
This capriciousness raises important questions – questions that are particularly relevant to a blanket policy that is overlaid onto the very uneven economic geography of England: to what extent are authorities in more affluent areas better placed to exact developer contributions relative to authorities in more deprived settings? Are market conditions the principal determinant of how well or poorly an authority does with respect to exacting developer contributions?  
On these questions there is some evidence that variation in the outcomes of planning applications for obligation value and incidence is not entirely explained by market activity.  Campbell et al., (2000) argue that weak local planning authority financial circumstances are a driver for the expansion of planning obligations mediated by negotiators increasing demands on developers. They argue though that these negotiations are fundamentally constrained by the market context within which they occur, giving rise to a joint behavioural and development activity explanation for the scale of obligation use. Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins (2016) argue that micro and macro-economic forces do not provide a sufficient explanation for variation in the value of planning obligations across England for three periods 2003/4, 2005/6 or 2007/8. Therefore, it follows, it is necessary to consider behavioural differences within local planning authorities to explain this variation.  
Another aspect of the capriciousness of the system is the fact that individual planning officers’ ability to bargain – quite apart from the geography of the local authority on whose behalf they are acting – constitutes part of the local planning culture and is a relevant aspect of how outcomes are determined (Campbell and Henneberry, 2005). This human-agential variable has garnered a great deal of academic interest in recent years giving rise to what might usefully be thought of as a ‘behavioural insights’ take on planning.  This approach builds upon behavioural psychology and behavioural economics to understand the heuristics and norms of planning practice (see, for example, Bond et al., 2016; Dunning. 2017; Ferrari et al., 2011; Jackson and Watkins, 2008; Lord, 2012; Lord and Gu, 2018).  
Henneberry and Parris (2013) illustrate how building and sustaining networks for projects are essential for the successful competition of a project. They stress the importance of informal networks where information and personal opinions can be converted into market signals, by completing consecutive projects with the same network knowledge and experience is accumulated developing “economies of repetition” (Grabher, 2004). Given the cost of forming new networks from afresh it would be logical to suggest that the costs for both the developer and a local authority are reduced if a consistent long-term relationship is formed, reducing uncertainty for all parties. Once these relationships are formed there is shared understanding of values and practices, and each party has an incentive to keep these constant, as it reduces costs for all (Taylor, 2013).
In the same research discussed above, Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins (2016) argue that agency in shifting planning culture at the level of the local planning authority is contingent upon learning through the sharing of best practice. Local planning authorities are capable of up-skilling in the negotiation and implementation of planning gain and as such capture more value by becoming both tactically and strategically strong in the negotiation of S106. The argument is premised upon a positive growth in the capacity of authorities, yet this suggests that the ability of developers or their representatives  within the negotiation process remains static. If in practice the development industry has a commensurate shift in its own ability to negotiate planning obligations, then any uplift in local authority skill may not have a corresponding uplift in planning gain. 
Work of this nature clearly speaks to the nascent ‘behavioural insights’ take on planning which emphasises the capacity of individual and collective behaviours to have a bearing on planning outcomes. This proposition finds echoes in the earlier literature on ‘planning cultures’, the idea that ways of working become established and normalised in different settings over time (Sanyal, 2005). In this paper we seek to further develop this behavioural insights understanding of planning. First, we explore through a regression model the degree to which ‘traditional’ variables explain variations in the value and incidence of developer contributions.  Second, we show that the explanatory gap between these traditional variables and reality can be attributed to the behaviour of local planning authorities and developers, and their joint values in the form of planning culture. 
Research Methods
To answer this question we explore a data set of survey responses derived from a national valuation of planning obligations undertaken for the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government for the year 2016/17. The research is the latest iteration of valuations undertaken in 2003/04, 2005/6, 2007/08 and 2011/12. The research combined both quantitative analysis, using a national survey of local planning authorities and qualitative interviews and workshops (further details of the methods can be found in Lord et al., 2018). We use evidence from both components of the project in this analysis.
A self-completion questionnaire was distributed via email to named planning officers in all English planning authorities in the summer of 2017. The survey focussed on the number and value of contributions, their operation and expenditure. The overall response rate to the survey was 46%, although some partial-completion meant that the response rate per question was lower in some cases. The responses are broadly representative of all planning authorities in England and no Government Office Region had less than 30% of authorities represented, in addition the survey respondents were responsible for granting permission for 48% of the total number of residential dwellings granted permission in 2016/17 (according to ABI Barbour data). For more details on the survey and response rate see Lord et al. (2018). 
Three roundtable discussions were held in the North West and South East of England with a total of 25 representatives from the development industry in 2017. Participants worked for large and small house builders, planning consultancies, land buying agencies, housing associations, government and trade body associations. The roundtables focussed on the impact of planning obligations and CIL on developer decision making processes. Each roundtable discussion covered the following: perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of S106 and CIL in delivering housing; how S106 and CIL are factored into land acquisition; variation in the negotiation of S106 and application of CIL; uncertainty and market conditions; and the delivery of infrastructure and house building. Each roundtable was attended and analysed by a minimum of two researchers independently and their insights then compared. Given the content of discussion and broad range of representatives the discussions were conducted according to the Chatham House Rule, therefore we present here our understanding of the discussion rather than verbatim evidence. In addition to the roundtable discussions 80 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with local planning authority officers, developers, planning consultants and land agents from a representative sample of 20 authority geographies across England. 
Combining these methods this research presents quantitative analysis at both the national and regional scales as well as qualitative insights from actors operating at both scales. The ensuing analysis explores the number and value of planning obligations and CIL at the regional scale; regression analysis identifying the impact of previously considered explanatory variables for the value of obligations; and qualitative evidence from the interviews and roundtable discussions of the variation in obligation values. 
Table 1. Mean number of non-householder planning permissions with contributions per authority (by region) and the value of planning obligations by regions in 2016/17
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Source: Lord et al,. (2018).
*This aggregate total does not include affordable housing commuted sum (direct payment) in lieu of in-kind provisions, which amounts to £75.4 million nationally. This value is included in the Total value of (non-in-kind affordable housing) planning obligations and CIL
Sizeable variation in the number and value of planning obligations and Community Infrastructure Levy occurred between regions across England in 2016/17, from over £2 billion in London to just over £100 million in the North East. 
Evidence of the determinants of variation in developer contributions: Regression Model 
There is no definitive research on the factors which determine the value of planning obligations, although there have been several exploratory attempts. Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins (2016) use data from three iterations of local planning authority survey and secondary data sources to model the relationship between the number and value of planning obligations with "a number of factors that we might reasonably postulate to have a causal relationship to the nature and monetary value of agreements secured in different parts of the country" (Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins, 2016, p.).  
Table 2. The key variables in the average value of planning agreements by local authority across 2003/4, 2005/6 & 2007/8INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Source: Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins, 2016

Two key issues are clear from table 2: the models have relatively low explanatory power, with a maximum R2 of .291 in 2005/06; and the significance of variables changes over the three periods, with only the average value of land continuing throughout. The period 2003/04 to 2007/08 experienced rapid increases in land prices and planning applications and then in 2007/08 a sharp decline in activity, which when combined with some variation in the authorities included in the model in different time periods, impacted the results. The lower R2 in 2007/08 suggests that as the complexity of the planning environment increases, linked to deteriorating market conditions, less of the variation in the value of obligations is explained through these market conditions alone. The authors of the previous models make the argument that:
"the factors that influence the number and value of obligations are complex and ever changing. It is clear that, even where there were similarities in the socio-economic and market context, the incidence and value of the obligations secured have been highly variable….. The models suggested that much of the variation, particularly in 2003/04, was attributable to local variations in practice and in the capacity to negotiate and secure obligations." (Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins, 2016, p.)
In this analysis we use the Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins (2016) model as the starting point but adjust several of the variables to account for changes in data availability. This time the basic models for value and number of planning obligations can be expressed, respectively, as follows:
OB-NO= f (PMKT, LV, SIZE, SOC, ECON, PLAN, STOCK), and 
OB-VAL= f (PMKT, LV, SIZE, SOC, ECON, PLAN, STOCK)
Where OB-NO is the number of planning obligations agreed in each year; OB-VAL is the annual monetary value of planning obligations; PMKT is a set of property market parameters including the average dwelling price, annual change in dwelling price, transaction turnover and current office rents (derived from Land Registry, MSCI and HBOS); LV is the residential land values and change in nominal land values (derived from the Valuation Office Agency); SIZE is the size (and change in the size) of the authority as measured by the past and future number of households and size of the local population (derived from Census Population and Official Household Projections); SOC is a suite of socio-economic local planning authority indicators including Deprivation Index Scores, proportion of household in various socio-economic groups including retired households (derived from ONS and Census); ECON is a vector of economic performance characteristics including levels of economically active households and unemployment rate (derived from 2011 Census Population); PLAN is a suite of local planning authority 'planning performance' indicators including the number of major and minor planning application, the number of granted permissions, and best value measures of the speed (within 8 weeks or 13 weeks) of planning decisions (derived from PS2 and MHCLG); STOCK is a series of property indicators with dwellings falling into council tax Band A, Band B, Band C, Band D, Band E, Band F, Band G and Band H.
It is assumed that there is a linear relationship between the dependent variables (the number of obligations or value of obligations) and the independent variables. We tried logarithmic, semi-log forms of the models but the explanatory power of these non-linear models was not higher than the linear form of the equations. The multicollinearity problem is minimised by dropping out the variables, based on the inspection of the simple correlation coefficients (Pearson Correlation statistic). The variables which generate pairwise correlation coefficients in excess of 0.4. were eliminated in order to minimise collinearity problem. These variables that are not included in the model are average dwelling price, transaction turnover , current office rents , change in nominal land values the size and change in the size of the authority as measured by the past and future number of households and size of the local population, economically active households , unemployment rate the number of major and minor planning application, the number of granted permissions, and best value measures of the speed (within 8 weeks of planning decisions and dwelling numbers falling into council tax Band A, Band B, Band C, Band D, Band E, Band F, Band G and Band H.
Table 3. The key variables in the average value of planning agreements by local authority in 2016/17INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
The results of the model are presented in Table 3. The overall explanatory power of the model is 0.12. The only significant variable on the value of planning agreements is average land values for the period in 2016/17. According to the model none of the other planning, social and economic parameters had a significant impact on the patterns of obligation values. 
When undertaking the same regression for the number of planning agreements (rather than value) the R2 value is 0.16 however, none of the variables (office income return; annual change % in dwelling price; annual change % in land values; number of household on local planning authority waiting list; number of households, GVA, % major and minor application granted, % employment rate and major planning decisions granted in under 13 weeks) are significant, as such we do not present the table here.
It is clear that, even under the most promising regression results from 2005/6, more than 70% of the determination of planning obligations remains unexplained. In keeping with the conclusions of Dunning, Ferrari and Watkins (2016) we concur that part of the missing explanation might reasonably be expected to result from local variations in planning practice. 
Evidence of the determinants of variation in developer contributions interviews and developer workshops
The regression model shows that there is a link between average land value and the values of agreements in local planning authorities and that this relationship is not constant over time, but that there is a substantial part of obligation values which is not explained through the regression variables. One explanation for this is that behavioural and cultural variation is not readily reduceable to known quantities currently collected by the government and as such planning culture is not adequately quantified in the models. The interviews and roundtable discussions explored whether behavioural variation through distinct planning cultures might be a factor in planning obligation values. 
If planning culture is defined by shared meanings (Knieling and Othengrafen, 2015), in this instance we would expect 'culture' to be shared meanings between developers and local planning authorities (or more accurately their representatives) in the negotiation of developer contributions. 
In short, we might hypothesise four alternative scenarios:
Fig.1 Scenarios for match between planning culture and planning gainINSERT FIGURE FIG.1 ABOUT HERE
Whilst some local authorities may be more expert than others in negotiating planning obligations and have greater expectations about the value of planning obligations, these will be combined with similar variation within the development industry.  Research supports the view that these variations become manifest in both approaches to negotiation and, particularly, the use of contrasting methodologies to support or question the prima facie case for development viability (Crosby, McAllister and Wyatt, 2013; McAllister, 2017; McAllister, Street and Wyatt, 2016). When considered in conjunction with context-specific questions, such as site availability, this may create a tapestry of intraregional variation that prohibits a simplistic market explanation of the variation in the value of planning obligations. To explore this argument, we sought as part of this research to explore the qualitative aspects of developer contribution negotiation and planning cultures. Our findings can be understood as falling into the two components which combine (or collide) to create planning culture: ‘the development industry’s’ values; and the values of local planning authorities.
I.	Values of 'the development industry' 
Discussion of developers in relation to planning obligations often assumes that there is a standard approach to development and negotiation. However, a clear message from the developer workshops was that it makes little sense to talk of one homogenous development industry: there is no standard developer. This chimes with Payne’s (2013) research which shows that when responding to changes in national planning policy, developers exhibited discrete behavioural responses. However, some care should be taken when considering the scale of delivery undertaken by different ‘types’ of developer, with volume housebuilders accounting for the majority of new houses delivered and exhibiting some homogeneity in behaviour (Payne, 2015). Yet Registered Social Landlords, volume housebuilders and local developers identified different views on risk, the negotiation of obligations and their financial models for deliberating on alternative developments. At the local level these different developer perspectives may not all be operating meaning that distinctions must be made between the types of developer motivation and behaviour. 
The differences between developer motivations and behaviour do not arise solely between regions (as explored by Coiacetto, 2000), but over particular parcels of land: in this respect there are important distinctions to be made between large and small; those which have varying footprints - national, regional and local; those which are equity-financed and those which depend on leverage; those which are PLCs and those which are privately owned; those that treat risk at the organisation level contrast with those that understand risk at the site-by-site scale; those that work primarily in markets characterised by high demand versus those that have become specialised in making development work in weaker market conditions. Because, as some planning operates within oligopolistic competition at best (Whitehead, 2014) the individual character of the developer comes into play. Although some points of continuity and contrast in approach can be discerned between developers of similar ‘types’, there were distinct answers about the impact of planning obligations on development activity, which leads us to the conclusion that there is sizeable variety in how developer type combines with local planning authority negotiating and market conditions to influence obligation value. Even developers of similar size and type often seem to have an individual ethos and habituated practices which have an impact on how planning obligations are perceived. Our findings in this respect accord with much of the work on a geographically segmented and contextually specific development industry that sometimes engages representative agencies to engage in the process by which development feasibility is evaluated and enacted (see, for example, Christophers, 2016). 
II.	Values of local planning authorities
Three discrete components were raised by developers and planning officers to understand the variation in values and meanings of local planning authorities in the construction of joint planning cultures, they are: site availability as a function of geography and local planning authority attitude; uncertainty and clarity in negotiating planning obligations; and the capacity of local planning authorities to proscribe culture. 
Site availability as a function of geography and local planning authority attitude
For some sites, particularly smaller developments that are relatively straightforward, there is some evidence that CIL’s transparency and uniformity encourages a prompt form of consent and delivery. However, reportage from the development industry roundtables suggests that few sites are sufficiently straightforward to be adequately covered by CIL alone. In many cases where a local planning authority has adopted CIL a separate planning obligation is also required in addition to the CIL charge. In these cases the presence of CIL does not result in a shorter negotiation period; on the contrary some testimonies would suggest that operating the two systems in parallel actually adds complexity and delay. The general view expressed in the developer roundtables we conducted was that on large scale developments CIL has not led to expedited permissions. 
It is in relation to these larger, strategic scale developments that the combination of CIL and S106 was seen as particularly problematic. For example, at this larger scale the negotiation of planning obligations will often require working with multiple authorities on specific issues (e.g. highways, two-tier authorities) which can act as a brake on development permissions even where an authority is largely enthusiastic about the application. For any developer seeking to operate at this larger scale the aggregate of CIL and S106 in parallel was said to introduce a greater degree of complexity that made delivering these larger developments slower. 
Uncertainty and clarity in negotiating planning obligations 
There was clear consensus amongst developers of all types that uncertainty was understood to be the principal negative aspect of planning obligations, for both S106 and CIL.  For some uncertainty was presented as an unwelcome cost of doing business that, particularly amongst smaller developers, was understood intuitively and may not be part of a formal cost projection. Amongst larger developers, particularly those with a national footprint, the risk of uncertainty and its costs were formally modelled at the scale of the organisation. In both cases, developers argued that they were able to price the likely cost of developer contributions into their development appraisals because they were able to predict the expectations of local planning authorities, which might result in no planning application coming forwards, but alternatively would encourage applications where the developer was most certain about their likely contribution. A clear account of how the risks of unknown developer contributions are codified into developers’ assessment of viability can be found in McAllister, Street and Wyatt, (2016), with empirical findings on how this affects outcomes in London in McAllister, Shepherd and Wyatt (2018).  Our research builds on this work by providing broader geographic insights into how developer behaviour is influenced by the uncertainty of how developer contributions might be estimated in the assessment of development feasibility: most developers were reluctant to see any further changes to obligations policies that would increase uncertainty.  
It was argued that uncertainty regarding the profitability of delivery through varied obligation costs was distributed back through the chain of interests that culminates in new development. Land owners, agents, buyers and assembly specialists as well as planning consultancies were some of the actors identified further down the chain as those potentially affected by uncertainty over the scale of developer contributions. Irrespective of developer type, the effect of planning obligations uncertainty was consistently said to be that the cost of contributions would be passed on to the land owner. It would then be up to land owners to determine whether and when to release land for development. The implication of this is clear: when there is uncertainty arising from a lack of shared meaning between the developer and local planning authority developers reflect this in more conservative budgeting.  This in turn has an effect on development viability and can dis-incentivise a risk-averse land market from making sites available for development. 
The introduction of CIL was supposed to decrease uncertainty in the market, with a transparent policy process and known values for developers to cost into their appraisals at an early stage. A recurring message from all three developer roundtables, which was reinforced by repeated interview testimony, was that developers have found CIL to be an unwelcome impediment in the development process in all but the simplest greenfield developments. They argued that they introduction of a tariff style planning gain hasn’t freed up the negotiation process, rather it is one of the components that is then amalgamated into the negotiation. 
Whilst CIL may operate at a sub-local planning authority spatial scale, some developers argued that this is not sufficiently spatially nuanced, as the very fine-grained geography of market conditions and site development costs mean that CIL may have very distinct impacts upon sites within close proximity. It was for this reason that CIL was described by one interviewee as a 'blunt tool'. 
In addition to spatial bluntness CIL may become dated quickly. Charging schedules are agreed over a negotiated and political process whereby evidence can be submitted and scrutinised.  However, once the level is set the schedule may become dated quite quickly as market conditions change. As such there is a temporal bluntness to CIL which will mean that similar market trends will have distinct local impacts based on the incidence and scale of CIL applicable. 
Although there was a general consensus that CIL has proved disappointing amongst those who attended our developer roundtables there was also critique of S106.  One of the most strident criticisms of the negotiated approach that underpins S106 agreements was said to be the variation in approach that this allowed amongst local planning authorities.  Some developers argued that this variation was even sometimes personal to specific planning officers.  
The implication of developer testimony is that the high degree of planning obligation policy heterogeneity even occurs between contiguous and comparable neighbouring local planning authority areas. It was argued by some that this privileged larger developers who had a greater understanding of what it took to do business with some authorities, accumulated over years of operation. If this is an accurate account of the personal nature of how planning obligations are determined in practice it would suggest a barrier to entry to newer and smaller developers who may be less familiar with the behavioural characteristics of the geographically variable S106 process.
Several participants in the roundtable sessions argued that, important though obligations policy is, the inclusion/exclusion of CIL only rarely determines the general appetite for development activity. In contrast other behavioural features were pointed to as being more important - the 'planning culture' (an authority's openness to development, its transparency in negotiation and timely agreement of permissions) – were said to be more important in identifying those authorities with whom a productive working relationship could be forged. From this perspective the question of where to develop becomes as much about the capacity, competency and general ethos of authorities as it does about market conditions and specific costs such as S106 and CIL.
The capacity of local planning authorities to influence culture 
Many developers pointed to a lack of capacity in local planning authorities to administer the process – whether S106, CIL or both – effectively. Several developers identified cuts to planning departments as having negatively affected the ability of local planning authorities to deal with planning applications that have obligations attached to them. This point was made repeatedly and in nuanced ways. Some developers pointed to diminishing head counts in planning departments which has resulted in it becoming more difficult to have sustained and meaningful engagement with the authority in question to construct shared meanings with. Others pointed to a loss of expertise as some of the best planners have moved to the private sector with the attendant effect that some authorities are said to be now both under-staffed and lacking specialist knowledge regarding the regulations that should apply vis a vis planning obligations. Finally, some developers also argued that most planners have actually had little practical experience of the development process and consequently lack an intimate understanding of how best to use planning obligations to meet local needs, a finding that has been repeated at different stages of the economic cycle (e.g. Claydon and Smith, 1997; Crook et al., 2016). 
Several development industry representatives argued that this variation in negotiation practice led them to distinguish between authorities with shared views on how negotiation might take place and the likely requirements within the planning obligations and authorities in which negotiators held divergent views. We might consider this as symptomatic of discrete planning cultures in which developers and authorities filter activity. 
Discussion
Complex planning environments for the extraction of value through the development process should not be defined in purely market terms. Value is extracted according to the internal and external relations between developer and local authority actors and as such is a political construction as much as a market response. The extraction of value is a contested concept and is not reducible to the value of planning obligations and CIL, as the development itself may constitute a public good, nevertheless, from this evidence we can conclude that where obligations and CIL act as indicators of public value through the development process, the impact of difficult markets on this value is filtered through the behaviour of authorities. 
The behaviour of actors in the negotiation process was identified as a possible factor in explaining variation in the value of planning obligations as an outcome of the development process in this research through the latest iteration of regression analyses. Its plausibility as a significant factor is advanced through the qualitative insights raised in development industry workshops and in interviews with officers at local planning authorities. This evidence supports the view that the financial values  of obligations are a product of both the market as context for negotiation and the wider culture of the actors involved in the negotiation (on the part of both the developer and the local planning authority), extending the argument that behaviour in planning gain negotiation is a function of context (Ennis, 1997). We argue that the outcome of negotiations in complex planning environments is at least partially determined by the relative compatibility of each party’s values.
The widespread variation in negotiating practices between different planning authorities and different developers highlighted in the interviews supports the argument that analysis of planning decisions needs to be assessed in light of local planning cultures and individual behaviours, which are interrelated with the development context rather than determined by them (cf. Healey and Barrett, 1990).  
Conclusions
Evidence from 2016/17 in England supports the proposition that the value of planning obligations and Community Infrastructure Levy is derived not only from market conditions but the culture and behaviour of local planning authorities. Further exploration is needed to confirm the hypothesis that the significance of planning culture and local authority behaviour is greater in difficult markets. The art of negotiating and extracting planning gain through the development process is itself a contested process, which is part of the wider planning culture both embodying and enacting the values of local authorities within the parameters of national planning guidance.
Calls to extend or amend the legislation for Section 106 and Community Infrastructure Levy in England and comparative land value capture mechanisms in other nations need to reflect on the planning cultures they operate within as much as the cyclical and structural market contexts. As such policy makers should acknowledge that where either permission or the level of value capture is negotiated there is the potential for cultural variation to derive the value of these. In difficult markets, where valuing land is itself a complex activity the behaviour of professionals may be of greater significance in enabling development activity and value extraction than in markets where value signals are clearer. 
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